平易近人的兩段...
第五章
9
But I think the main mistake of Mr. Wells's philosophy is a somewhat deeper one, one that he expresses in a very entertaining manner in the introductory part of the new Utopia. His philosophy in some sense amounts to a denial of the possibility of philosophy itself. At least, he maintains that there are no secure and reliable ideas upon which we can rest with a final mental satisfaction. It will be both clearer, however, and more amusing to quote Mr. Wells himself.
但我想威爾斯哲學思維中最大的錯謬其實遠比上述要更為深入，這錯誤清晰呈現於他對新烏托邦那極富娛樂效果的引言中。某種角度來看，他的哲學觀指向對哲學本身存在的可能性的否定，至少，他認為並不存在讓我們足以感到心靈安適滿足的穩定可靠思想，在此引用威爾斯自己的話，應該能將這點表現得更為清楚，也更為有趣。
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He says, "Nothing endures, nothing is precise and certain (except the mind of a pedant).... Being indeed!—there is no being, but a universal becoming of individualities, and Plato turned his back on truth when he turned towards his museum of specific ideals." Mr. Wells says, again, "There is no abiding thing in what we know. We change from weaker to stronger lights, and each more powerful light pierces our hitherto opaque foundations and reveals fresh and different opacities below." Now, when Mr. Wells says things like this, I speak with all respect when I say that he does not observe an evident mental distinction. It cannot be true that there is nothing abiding in what we know. For if that were so we should not know it all and should not call it knowledge. Our mental state may be very different from that of somebody else some thousands of years back; but it cannot be entirely different, or else we should not be conscious of a difference. Mr. Wells must surely realize the first and simplest of the paradoxes that sit by the springs of truth. He must surely see that the fact of two things being different implies that they are similar. The hare and the tortoise may differ in the quality of swiftness, but they must agree in the quality of motion. The swiftest hare cannot be swifter than an isosceles triangle or the idea of pinkness. When we say the hare moves faster, we say that the tortoise moves. And when we say of a thing that it moves, we say, without need of other words, that there are things that do not move. And even in the act of saying that things change, we say that there is something unchangeable.
他說：「無物長久存在，無物精準確實（老學究的心智除外）…真真確確的！沒有什麼是真真確確的，只有普世化的個體性，就連柏拉圖，當他轉向他那包羅各種觀點想法的博物館時，也轉離了真理。」接著他又說：「在我們所知的萬物中，沒有什麼是持久不變的，我們從弱光轉為強光，並隨著能量增強，這光穿透刺入我們至今為止不透光的表皮，曝露引出底層嶄新不同的另一層光阻。」當威爾斯這樣說的時候，我無意表達不敬，但他明顯漏失了一個心智特徵。在我們所知的萬物中不可能全無一物是持久不變的，因為倘若如此，我們不可能知道，也無法稱這認識為知識。我們的心智能力可能與幾千年前的古人差距甚大，但不可能完全不同，因倘若完全不同，我們也無法意識到這不同。威爾斯一定明白，最基礎、最簡單的悖論鄰近真理之泉。他也一定知道，如兩樣事物不同，意味著他們相似。兔子與烏龜可能在速度上有差異，但他們的動作本質相同。最快的兔子無法比等腰三角形或粉紅色快。當我們說兔子移動速度較快時，我們同時在說烏龜也會移動。當我們說某物會移動時，無需特別強調，大家都明白，這代表有些東西不會移動。即使當我們說有些事物改變時，也是在說有些事物不會改變。
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