第五章
11
But certainly the best example of Mr. Wells's fallacy can be found in the example which he himself chooses. It is quite true that we see a dim light which, compared with a darker thing, is light, but which, compared with a stronger light, is darkness. But the quality of light remains the same thing, or else we should not call it a stronger light or recognize it as such. If the character of light were not fixed in the mind, we should be quite as likely to call a denser shadow a stronger light, or vice versa If the character of light became even for an instant unfixed, if it became even by a hair's breadth doubtful, if, for example, there crept into our idea of light some vague idea of blueness, then in that flash we have become doubtful whether the new light has more light or less. In brief, the progress may be as varying as a cloud, but the direction must be as rigid as a French road. North and South are relative in the sense that I am North of Bournemouth and South of Spitzbergen. But if there be any doubt of the position of the North Pole, there is in equal degree a doubt of whether I am South of Spitzbergen at all. The absolute idea of light may be practically unattainable. We may not be able to procure pure light. We may not be able to get to the North Pole. But because the North Pole is unattainable, it does not follow that it is indefinable. And it is only because the North Pole is not indefinable that we can make a satisfactory map of Brighton and Worthing.
然而，顯然關於威爾斯錯謬思維最佳的例證，來自他自己舉的例子。的確，與較昏暗的事物相比，微弱的燈光變為亮光，但當放在較明亮的光源下時，這微光就變得幽暗。但這光的本質不變，否則我們就不會稱呼這光為光，也不會對這物質有這樣的理解跟認識。若我們對光的特質沒有固定的認知，那我們也可能會稱厚重的黑影為光，或者反之亦然。光的特質一旦失去其恆常性，只要些微變得可疑，舉例來說，只要我們腦中對光的認識混雜入一些模糊的藍色意象，那麼當光出現時，那刻間，我們會疑惑究竟這是比較亮還是比較暗。簡言之，進展、進步或許跟雲彩的變化一樣變幻莫測，但變化本身的方向必定跟法國的馬路一樣筆直、穩固。在我處於伯恩茅斯（Bournemouth）北邊與斯匹次卑爾根（Spitzbergen）南邊的情境中，北與南是相對的概念，對若有人對於北極的位置存疑，那他肯定同樣困惑我究竟是否位於斯匹次卑爾根的南邊。光的絕對定義或許無法實際取得，我們可能無法提取出單一、純粹的光，我們可能也無法到北極。但無法到北極，並不代表北極的位置無法被界定。而正因為北極並非無法劃定疆界，我們才得以在地圖上繪製出布萊頓（Brighton）跟沃辛（Worthing）。
12
In other words, Plato turned his face to truth but his back on Mr. H. G. Wells, when he turned to his museum of specified ideals. It is precisely here that Plato shows his sense. It is not true that everything changes; the things that change are all the manifest and material things. There is something that does not change; and that is precisely the abstract quality, the invisible idea. Mr. Wells says truly enough, that a thing which we have seen in one connection as dark we may see in another connection as light. But the thing common to both incidents is the mere idea of light— which we have not seen at all. Mr. Wells might grow taller and taller for unending aeons till his head was higher than the loneliest star. I can imagine his writing a good novel about it. In that case he would see the trees first as tall things and then as short things; he would see the clouds first as high and then as low. But there would remain with him through the ages in that starry loneliness the idea of tallness; he would have in the awful spaces for companion and comfort the definite conception that he was growing taller and not (for instance) growing fatter.
這也就是說，當柏拉圖轉向他那包羅各種觀點想法的博物館時，他其實是背著威爾斯，並將臉轉向了真理，這正是柏拉圖展現他的思維之處。一切都會改變，並非真的。會改變的都是可見與物質的事物。有些事物不會變，而那些正是抽象的本質，那看不見的概念。威爾斯說得沒錯，有些事物在某一情境中會被我們看為黑暗，但在另一情境下又被視為光亮。但在這兩種情境下，相同存在的，是光這概念——而這是我們看不見的。威爾斯或許能在無止盡的永恆中長得愈來愈高，直到他的頭高過天際最遠的孤星，我甚至可想像他對此創作一本小說。在這過程中，樹木在他眼中會先是高大，接著變為矮小；雲會先是高聳如天，接著變成低矮如地。但在他那如不隕星辰般久長的萬世孤寂中，不變的是，他對「高」的概念。在他那無比巨大（虛空的），可容納同伴與舒適的星空裡，他存有一明確、清楚的認識，那就是他愈長愈高，而非（舉例來說）愈長愈胖。
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說胖就傷感情了
Chesterton 真壞XDDD
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