第二章終於到了尾聲
（這令人又欣喜又痛苦的三段....）
第7段
Every one of the popular modern phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is good. We are fond of talking about "liberty"; that, as we talk of it, is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about "progress"; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about "education"; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. The modern man says, "Let us leave all these arbitrary standards and embrace liberty." This is, logically rendered, "Let us not decide what is good, but let it be considered good not to decide it." He says, "Away with your old moral formulae; I am for progress." This, logically stated, means, "Let us not settle what is good; but let us settle whether we are getting more of it." He says, "Neither in religion nor morality, my friend, lie the hopes of the race, but in education." This, clearly expressed, means, "We cannot decide what is good, but let us give it to our children."
為逃避「何為善」這問題，每個現代語彙與概念都成了閃躲規避的工具。我們喜愛談論「自由」，而當我們談論自由時，我們其實是在規避討論何為善。我們喜歡討論「進步」，為了不要討論何為善。我們喜歡討論「教育」，而這也是為了不要討論何為善。現代人說：「讓我們拋棄那些武斷的標準，擁抱自由。」這說法的邏輯等同是：「讓我們不要決定什麼是善的，但不判定何為善這決定本身是好的。」有人說：「拋下你的老舊道德規範，我要進步。」又說：「我親愛的朋友，無論是宗教或道德，都無法提供人類希望，只有教育才能。」而這基本上是在說：「我們無法決定何為善，但就讓我們這樣教育小孩吧。」
第8段
Mr. H.G. Wells, that exceedingly clear-sighted man, has pointed out in a recent work that this has happened in connection with economic questions. The old economists, he says, made generalizations, and they were (in Mr. Wells's view) mostly wrong. But the new economists, he says, seem to have lost the power of making any generalizations at all. And they cover this incapacity with a general claim to be, in specific cases, regarded as "experts", a claim "proper enough in a hairdresser or a fashionable physician, but indecent in a philosopher or a man of science." But in spite of the refreshing rationality with which Mr. Wells has indicated this, it must also be said that he himself has fallen into the same enormous modern error. In the opening pages of that excellent book MANKIND IN THE MAKING, he dismisses the ideals of art, religion, abstract morality, and the rest, and says that he is going to consider men in their chief function, the function of parenthood. He is going to discuss life as a "tissue of births." He is not going to ask what will produce satisfactory saints or satisfactory heroes, but what will produce satisfactory fathers and mothers. The whole is set forward so sensibly that it is a few moments at least before the reader realises that it is another example of unconscious shirking. What is the good of begetting a man until we have settled what is the good of being a man? You are merely handing on to him a problem you dare not settle yourself. It is as if a man were asked, "What is the use of a hammer?" and answered, "To make hammers"; and when asked, "And of those hammers, what is the use?" answered, "To make hammers again". Just as such a man would be perpetually putting off the question of the ultimate use of carpentry, so Mr. Wells and all the rest of us are by these phrases successfully putting off the question of the ultimate value of the human life.
H. G. 威爾斯（譯註：Herbert George Wells，通常被稱為H. G. 威爾斯），這位腦袋清醒、目光銳利的作家，在他最近的作品中指出，這樣的狀況也在對經濟問題的診斷上出現。他說，老一輩的經濟學家會進行通則性的推導（generalization），而（根據威爾斯的看法）他們大多時候都是錯的。但新一代的經濟學家，卻似乎完全失去進行任何尋找通則、整體脈絡的能力。為了掩飾自己在這方面的無能，他們使用一些在特定情境下，可被視為是「專家」之言的空泛模糊聲明，這些聲明「若出自於理髮師或跟得上潮流的醫生之口，還尚可接受，但絕非體面莊重的哲學家或科學家說得出的」。雖然H. G. 威爾斯以震聾發聵的理性發表這段言論，但不得不提的是，他其實也同樣陷入這現代錯謬之阱。在他那本精彩的著作——創造的人（MANKIND IN THE MAKING暫翻）的開篇頁中，他屏棄藝術、宗教、抽象道德觀等的理想，並表示他只把焦點放在人的首要功能上，那功能就是養兒育女、為人父母。他將生命視為「為創造繼起之生命而存在」（譯註：原文tissue of birth，直譯為生育的細胞），他不探究怎樣能產生令人讚賞的聖人或英雄，而只思考怎樣能產生好的父母。而這整個論述鋪陳得如此理智，以致於讀者要在幾頁之後才領會，這不過又是一個未經思索下閃躲的例子。若我們不先釐清身為人有何美善之處，那懷孕分娩、讓新生兒來到世上又哪裡美？哪裡善呢？你只不過是把一個你規避、不敢回答的問題丟給新生兒。這就好像一個人被問：「鎚子有何作用？」卻回答：「製造更多鎚子。」又被問：「那這些產生的鎚子，又有何用？」再答：「再製造更多鎚子。」就像這個一直推託、逃避回答鎚子有何用的人，H. G. 威爾斯以及我們所有人，也都成功運用上述那些語彙，來拖延、閃躲那關於人生價值的終極問題。
第9段
The case of the general talk of "progress" is, indeed, an extreme one. As enunciated today, "progress" is simply a comparative of which we have not settled the superlative. We meet every ideal of religion, patriotism, beauty, or brute pleasure with the alternative ideal of progress—that is to say, we meet every proposal of getting something that we know about, with an alternative proposal of getting a great deal more of nobody knows what. Progress, properly understood, has, indeed, a most dignified and legitimate meaning. But as used in opposition to precise moral ideals, it is ludicrous. So far from it being the truth that the ideal of progress is to be set against that of ethical or religious finality, the reverse is the truth. Nobody has any business to use the word "progress" unless he has a definite creed and a cast-iron code of morals. Nobody can be progressive without being doctrinal; I might almost say that nobody can be progressive without being infallible —at any rate, without believing in some infallibility. For progress by its very name indicates a direction; and the moment we are in the least doubtful about the direction, we become in the same degree doubtful about the progress. Never perhaps since the beginning of the world has there been an age that had less right to use the word "progress" than we. In the Catholic twelfth century, in the philosophic eighteenth century, the direction may have been a good or a bad one, men may have differed more or less about how far they went, and in what direction, but about the direction they did in the main agree, and consequently they had the genuine sensation of progress. But it is precisely about the direction that we disagree. Whether the future excellence lies in more law or less law, in more liberty or less liberty; whether property will be finally concentrated or finally cut up; whether sexual passion will reach its sanest in an almost virgin intellectualism or in a full animal freedom; whether we should love everybody with Tolstoy, or spare nobody with Nietzsche;—these are the things about which we are actually fighting most. It is not merely true that the age which has settled least what is progress is this "progressive" age. It is, moreover, true that the people who have settled least what is progress are the most "progressive" people in it. The ordinary mass, the men who have never troubled about progress, might be trusted perhaps to progress. The particular individuals who talk about progress would certainly fly to the four winds of heaven when the pistol shot started the race. I do not, therefore, say that the word "progress" is unmeaning; I say it is unmeaning without the previous definition of a moral doctrine, and that it can only be applied to groups of persons who hold that doctrine in common. Progress is not an illegitimate word, but it is logically evident that it is illegitimate for us. It is a sacred word, a word which could only rightly be used by rigid believers and in the ages of faith.
在這當中，大眾對於「進步」的討論是一個再明顯不過的例子。今日對於這詞的闡述，表明「進步」不過是一個在不知「最高級」為何下的比較級概念（不知最好為何下，進行比較的概念）。我們用進步的理念，來取代各種宗教、愛國主義、美、甚至感官享樂的理想典範。這就像是與其去追求獲得我們所知道的事物，我們以追求獲得一堆我們所不知道的事物來取代。若正確理解，進步具有最為嚴肅與正當的意涵。但當它被用於取代明確的道德典範時，就變得愚蠢可笑了。隨著進步與真理漸行漸遠，進步的理念被設定為道德或宗教典範的相對詞，與進步相反者，成了真理。除非一個人有明確的信念或銘刻在心的道德感，使用「進步」這詞根本無意義。一個人若非遵守教條、規範，否則根本不可能進步。我甚至可說，除非無過失、不犯錯，或至少相信「無過」的重要性，那沒有人能進步。因為進步這詞本身就隱含著方向，我們對此方向最為肯定的那刻，我們對進步也最為確信。創世以來，有史以來，我們比起所有的時代，都更加沒有資格使用「進步」這詞。在天主教主導的十二世紀，在充斥哲學思維的十八世紀，他們的方向或好或壞，人們對於他們的發展、所朝的方向或許意見不一，但對於他們大多同意的方向，他們最終獲得因進步而得的真實喜悅。但我們所無法達到一致同意的，正是方向。要打造美好的未來，究竟需要更多或是更少法律的管轄，要有更多或更少自由；貧富會愈來愈不均，或最終消失；性之激情究竟是以童貞般智性的方式，還是以動物本能般自由的方式才最為健康；我們是該跟托爾斯泰一樣愛所有人，還是像尼采一樣不饒人。這些是我們爭論、掙扎不休的問題。這「號稱進步」的世代不僅是最不懂進步的世代，這世代中「最進步」的人還是最不懂進步的人。一般人，那些從不會刻意思考進步這問題的人，還有可能真正進步。但那些一直談論進步的進步人士，當賽跑槍聲響起時，絕對是立刻奔逃到四方。因此，我不是說「進步」這詞毫無意義。而是認為，在不具有道德規章之定義下，是毫無意義的，它僅適用於認同同樣規範的族群。進步並非錯謬的詞，但邏輯證明，我們使用這詞是個錯誤。這是一個神聖的詞，這詞如要正確使用，只能由信仰嚴謹的人，在有信仰的時代中使用。
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